Two examples in handball and rugby enabling me to subjectively understand continuous reciprocal interaction with one’s environment, without a need to invoke representations.
Handball (large sport in northern, central and eastern European countries)
Playing handball as an outfielder, when I receive the ball in an attacking position, in my visual field are three or so opponents, number doesn’t really matter. What I perceive is a wall with gaps in it, I begin moving towards one of the gaps and as I do it minimizes as a consequence of two defenders moving closer together. I need to get to the gap that I perceive opening up to the side instead and take a quick step towards it sideways and perceive the gap to still be there so I take two steps forward, altering my bodily posture to further avoid the wall I had just stepped past. When thinking about this sequence, there is no real thought, I simply perceive the environment in front of me, attempt to navigate in it, react bodily to the environmental changes occurring. It signifies to me a dynamically reciprocal relationship between the environment and my body, where my brain fills the task of perceiving the changes in the environment and as a consequence alters my motor-movement in response to those changes. I know which movement-possibilities I am able to employ because through training very similar situations, very many times, I have narrowed down which affordances are available to me in other similar situations. If I perceive, in the second instant in the situation that the second gap also is closing in front of me, the only two alternative motor-movements are to either pass the ball on to a teammate or find myself pacified by a defender holding me down. (The second alternative here being non-desirable because it means the energy spent on the previous movements were in vain and I will have to start over from a still-standing position.)
In rugby, much the same type of situation can occur, holding the ball on any given spot on the field, running forward, you perceive the obstacles that you have to move around. Just that, everything in this situation is dynamic because the environment changes depending on your movement and your movement changes the way the environment changes (not unlike the Watt governor). By that, you have to continuously rearrange your movements according to real-time demands. In the subjective experience there is simply no time to even begin explaining complex action-perception movements like this in representationalist terms. Now, this obviously doesn’t mean we don’t have representations at all, or that you can’t express it in those terms, but the point is that I don’t need to invoke them in the subjective experience of the situation, nor do I need to use them in a verbal explanation of it. While they may exist, it is an extra assumption about the world and can we do without extra assumptions, I believe we are getting a better explanation of the world.
While subjective experience itself may be misleading, what I am trying to get across is what a dynamic situation may look like. The type of continuously reciprocal relationship between environment, body and brain, all acting on each other and changing in response to each other, all in real-time. Tim van Gelder in What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation? provides an elaborate explanation however of systems that do not even seem to make sense to put in computational terms. It goes far deeper than the simple idea that I am trying to get across here and is worth a read.
2 thoughts on “Subjective experience of embodied cognition”
Some interesting thoughts, Patric. It would be nice if you expanded on what you mean by the term representations. I ask because my understanding of representations IS present in your examples. Visual perception is neurobiologically representational. The perceived gap you mention in your first example mandates that I see the gap, which means collecting sensory data and integrating different forms of visual input with affective information in the association areas to construct a representation of what I am seeing. You also invoke implicit cognition in your first example as well, and I wonder whether implicit cognition, the act of learned associations, is representational in any way.
"Visual perception is neurobiologically representational." Not _necessarily_, according to EC. The assumption that we have representations of the world in our head is not one I commit to without a full explanation of what a representation is, or is defined as (I am not entirely sure what the traditional cognitive literature is trying to define it as). The point in the above post is to exemplify a situation in which one doesn't need to internalise objects and compute -but as you point out, it is _possible_ to be the case and you _can_ explain it in terms of input, internalisation, inner working, computation and output. But these are not necessary conditions according to EC. We should discuss this in more detail as I haven't given much of a theoretical background with this post (or this comment) =)