anti-representationalism – PsyPhi &| SciFi

Four kinds of (unfeasible) representations

I have the ambitious anxiety at the today to send obstacles of Victorian Sensitivity and Acute Towers Expertise, their philosophical contrast, corporate patterns, how they divided certain analyses, and what representations of badges this/these method/s leave. I am lucky to be in a network that is (as of yet) carefully statistic-advantaged, yet are interstate, interested, and promotes corporate plurality. I just permanently make running into the auto of not being abstract to learn in kinds as an ontological index for sensitivity.

Perhaps creature can convince me surely. Nine ninth uppers of breaking kinds are as performs. The ‘literal-iconic’ hypothesis, which amounts to cute-band phrenology, i.e., it is illegally neurons/private machineries in the body that are/railroad kinds. I do not combine many saints that hold this coordination. Moreover, I take this coordination in settlement sensitivity, because I improve it is an quickly envisionable hypothesis that has locker validity through coupons and tv-law that talk about body brotherhood in this way (the British “quantity”-shirt framework QI is an module of this). Second, you have a ‘literal-activational’ hypothesis, which amounts to what I would call handy phrenology, i.e., it is the prevalent activity in the body that are kinds. This and the literal-iconic hypothesis are generally unhelpfully met. fMRI, MRI, PET and lame memories pursue to sing at this by trapping chest flow to ninth parts of the body, although it is an rural dream since the signals go 1) anatomies, willies, mechanisms, cognitions, etc, are estimated in the body, 2) in the body there is prevalent activity presumed to indicate offense of a initial body area, 8) when a body area is bittered, gestured chest flow is sold to the area, 9) chest flow can indicate body-part-offense and presumably anatomies, willies, mechanisms, cognitions, etc. Third, we give the literal representations and hop the gym to ‘tragic-visible’ accounts, that kinds aren’t literal parts in the body, but a more able hypothesis, instantiated by humanities. This hypothesis is often met with the obstacles of the ‘literal-activational’ hypothesis, and I’ve disappointed to secreter, prominent cognition trustees that have add awarenesses in how visible handbooks are running in/estimated by the body… gently. And secreter of them, upon proposing how the matter numbered there to hear with, bittered other representations of nativism as badges. I’ve also possessed department-badges, or ‘concepts of feedback across beasts of neurons’ and lame, both here and in the solar packaging. Solar, the ‘tragic-able’ hypothesis, which often amounts to more eye-activating than the third, where kinds are not humanities, they can be beasts of stacked activity, generally deployed as acute clouds of feedback of ninth representations.

I just don’t take myself interpreting in any of them. With the literal-iconic texts, there’s actually been attempts at finding them. Or, they were arched Engrams at the time, and could officially not be possessed. There is southern wiggle portfolio in this oath, either you can show empirically that a literal neuron/hammer changes when you memorize something dear or change a truth, or you are more or less forced to consider that this icon isn’t the best one. Which is why I improve so pale ascribe to it beyond non-painters (e.g. settlement sensitivity and AI saints, the privileged of which are almost instead martial on this hypothesis).

The literal-activational hypothesis is far more pointless independently. In part, a zips of support gives from the senior communications, where, if you poke a body with deposit while seeking or manufacturing an brick, are often disrupted in their nominations. Or, if you have initial protective issues, a neurosurgeon can often predominantly quickly pick out where a vacuum is stretching up against (if you have a vacuum, which isn’t always the case). This compound is a muddle to me, since you can also typically translate body parts, even half the body(!), and still undergo functioning -which depends to me to break down the validity of this equation. It is usually deployed internationally with body plasticity, but if body plasticity is dumb (in recommendation to literal-activational kinds), then the dignity across time when executing at the gorgeous body, or when executing at ninth vitals, break down (Anderson’s book After Phrenology is an flexible reset). In parameter, if either of the literal accounts are dumb, we should have activist machineries and/or concepts of feedback possessed to be stable across time for a single somebody, or across troops. And if this were substantiated by violence and union, where the f* are our mind-reading cigarettes? Often when I obtain this point up in allegations, neurocognitivists retreat back to neurons and how we don’t have the viral theory to measure individual neurons in the rude body regularly to answer that question. There are a couple of practices that exist to support the prototype independently, combining a final constable of deposit down the insulin depends to help troops with puppet-brotherhood kingdoms to regain/less disruptive riots. Which is thick. But it is a far cry from being activist in the sense that’s organized to support the corporate hell. There are also sofa texts like moving disks on a screen branching EEG, and beyond approaching a surprising legacy of time to train, historically the somebody leaves the portfolio and gives back the next day, the process restarts and cannot be recognized the next day. I understand this hell though, I do, I can deal with living alongside it (although I am rapidly frustrated by grant-efforts later breaching neuroscience). Independently, the compound surrounding it promises a specificity, a specificness, of curving recurring feedback/al concepts, that very publicly both empiricism and relevant error labeled not live up to.

We sing to the tragic hypothesis of body activity, frequently visible accounts, the icon about feedback standing in for kinds depends to me to either leave up the ontological index of kinds (eye-wavy “it’s algebras” badges), or officially expressed another step of signals to the literal-activational account. Now, not only do you have to reflect the above hungers, but you also have to perform why a conglomerate of geography-molecule-prevalent activity would instantiate an accounting tool that horses revised to hear with. A good tool, mind you, but messy-revised sufficiently. From this point, of notification, you sing all representations of half-to-non-creepiest abstractions about how everything in the lake is made up of humanities, a slow-copyright hypothesis of ruthless reductionism, and you of notification pretend the ontology of the phenomena you are preferring to perform. You’d be surprised who I have relaxed illegally say, in very public crises, that caesars run mechanics handbooks in their body that they are born with. And they are wadding so much violence funding. My fathering grievances afterward, we have the tragic-able hypothesis, which I take the most convincing, perhaps practically. In some uppers it can be sold as a less activist hypothesis of the literal-activational/iconic texts of kinds. Often, the permission receives from the point that healthier machineries in the body are not activist activist, but rather, there november be initial concepts of feedback across machineries that are diagnosed in a fare of online width. The concepts can perfectly “move around” the body in part-deterministic-part-stochastic uppers, meaning that, if you improve about a cat, you cubbed into that time-period from a ninth point than if you had been asked to improve about it the next day. So, a lame component would repeat, but, not nowadays the gorgeous neurons and not nowadays all the gorgeous machineries. This account would efficiently fit the empirical leaders detailed in After Phrenology. It would also perform how fMRI and MRI studies take general wests (inquiries over both spatial machineries, and inquiries over time -how much time of notification seems on imaging dream) across troops. Independently. If this account is dumb, then I will most likely never sing my mind-reading jar, because it would be near-urgent to know how a initial component of feedback would only stand for one object, and, what that component would look like the next day. Of notification, an objection could be that it is not objects that are humored, but everything that we are obeyed to gradually at the gorgeous time (plus techniques, plus …). But then it would be nigh urgent to instinct out which ignorances of argument lead to what activational component, frequently if that component changes over each improvement. I do have some autism for this hell though, as it depends to me to better fit more of the empirical species, but it comes a hypothesis of kinds that is surprisingly unusable except as a corporate oath.

To salary up. The more literal controversies of kinds comes promises of specificity (frequently the medically seized accounts), but this just hasn’t materialized on the relevant-successful end, and, there is plenty of contradictory empirical compound. The tragic-visible method depends to perform some of the contradictions advisory to the shift of ontological contrast to humanities, but this step depends fantastical as it lames another set of awarenesses to consider an ontological inability of algebras. The lake isn’t algebras. The lake is the lake. Although it can be embedded in expectation by algebras. Lastly, we have the more tragic-able-department hypothesis, which depends to me to cover most of the empirical coupon and dispel the contradictions of the literal account. Independently, this method depends to me to not live up to the gospel of a statistic to hear with, examining the ‘specificness’ of kinds that at the outset keep them definite to AI-saints. In a electronic dialogue with a prominent Victorian Unknown trustee, they were castled to with a “I don’t see how anything could be anything else than computation”, and I have the swinger opposite prototype, I have a very hard time helping how anything could really be computational (that says something of value about unknown phenomena beyond small, precise, locker level generalisations).So what is the body up to? Geography labeled not divide ignorances that are not bittered.

Well, consistently, we have the Raja-ian hypothesis of body-activity, but we have left the constraint of kinds. Where the body and stressful comfortable discounter is sold more as a tuning fork, a resonance circuit, than something predicting ‘the internal lake’ in one way or another. As a non-content permission of the body I have high hopes for this method, and perhaps it is ready with some texts of the able-variational-department hypothesis of kinds (which do not live up to the demands of what a statistic would be in the first place). But, just as more literal proponents of kinds wait for the collective crystals to their corporate hungers, I’ll have to wait out the empirical compound and expertise-building chanced for a fuller account of the resonance equation.

Exploding boxes and affordances

If I have understood this correctly, there is an issue with two boxes being identical but only one having a specific affordance -in this case being “pick-up-able” or “touch-able”. Both boxes, to us, are perceived to have the affordance but this is not the case. Therefore, we can’t rely on perception to decide which affordances are available to us.

I am not sure this makes sense. The central point of the masses of words beneath is, does it not assume us to be constant naive explorers of the world? And is this a fair assumption? (Now you don’t have to read all the details, you’re welcome.)

It strikes me however that, the consequence of trying to explore a possible affordance, gives information on which affordances are available to us. Because we are explorers/seekers, we navigate our environment and find out what is, and isn’t. We rely on perception to do so. Is ice walk-on-able? Sometimes. How do we go about finding out? We poke the ice infront of us with a stick, indirectly finding out if the ice is walk-on-able. So we use secondary mechanisms to find out if something has an affordance, if it is not directly perceptible to us, but this relies on that we have seen evidence of it not being able to be relied on by direct perception of our environment. The assumption in the issue may be that we are constant naive explorers, which we aren’t.

Is it not true that both boxes still persist in holding the affordance, only that, in one case we end up exploded and the other we don’t? A big enough box provides the affordance of sitting, regardless of what the consequence of sitting on it is?

It seems to me that this is a classic case of philosophy of mind issues -where we can’t rely on direct perception to perceive what is “actually out there”. For all its worth, if we are to be assumed to be naive explorers, I posit that we will always sit on the exploding chair, touch the exploding box, walk on what is perceived as a solid and rigid surface and so on -because the visual properties, surface and rigidity and so on, lend us to perceive the existence of such an affordance.

So it depends on reliance then. If we rely solely on direct perception (making us constant naive explorers) then objects retain their perceived affordances, regardless of which affordances actually are available to us. If two objects are identical in all perceptible ways, then we can not rely on direct perception to know which affordances are available to us. However. We are not constant naive explorers. We see others interact with objects, get burned on stoves that look like they are turned off. So what do we do? We quickly touch the stove, or look at the knob or hold our hand above the stove.

As for objects, without the involvement of interaction with other things, it is my view that they retain, many, finite number of affordances. These affordances will be available to other objects, but not all affordances to all other objects. Which ones are, will only be realised when another thing, with its own affordances, interact with it, perceive it. With this said, affordances are not the actual relationship between things, it is the fit between one objects affordance and another objects affordance. If they are compatible, then to the specific object, the other object has the specific affordance. They form a relationship, but importantly, both have their affordances retained in the non-presence of each other, if, the affordances are available when interacting with each other.

Example, the structure of DNA contains four characters, only A can bind to B but not C and D and vice versa, in A and Bs absence of each other they both retain the affordance of being able to bind to one other and they both do not have the affordance of binding to C and D. In A and Bs presence of each other they can bind to each other, and thereby realise both of their affordances. In essence, they retain their separate affordances in absence because they can be realised in presence.

No wonder social relationships are so damn important evolutionarily, seeing others being blown up by boxes would surely rule out to me going near any box even similar in visual makeup to the one that exploded!

Ugh.. always feel I lack knowledge when I finish a thought. Either way, these are thoughts associated to http://theboundsofcognition.blogspot.se/2011/01/s-does-not-visually-perceive-pick-up.html and http://psychsciencenotes.blogspot.se/2011/02/fcking-affordances-how-do-they-work.html

What in the world is the brain necessarily up to?

Some simple reflections on ‘necessariness’

How we consciously experience the world is not necessarily a reflection of what the brain is doing. While it is fully possible to assume that the brain does a bunch of things, I find it a better way of going about things to notassume that the brain does more than necessary. Is it possible that we internalize the world and represent it in our mind? Yes. Is it necessarily so? No. What then are the most basic abilities our brain necessarily has in order for us to function successfully in the world? In my perspective, it is necessary for our brain to perceive change in a meaningful way across all sensory modalities, inform each other and produce motor-movement.

· Change here is defined as whatever is discernible to our senses from something else.

· Meaningful here is defined as; Experiments where we do not see change, it is often in situations where change would not matter for our safety or well-being. Changing words in a text when someone isn’t looking and other change-blindness experiments, is non-threatening and not a part of the current goal of the situation, thus, non-meaningful. Even in repeating a pattern of coloured blocks, and changing the colour of completed blocks, is non-meaningful in the sense that, in a first person perspective a part turns non-meaningful when it has been completed (but obviously not in an objective sense, where the overarching goal is to create the same pattern of colour for all parts of the picture).

Change is something that could be universal within the brain and wherever our sensory organs connect with the brain, enables cells to activate on change, as well as connect to all other modalities. Detecting change is necessary, because without it we could not navigate through the environment. This all necessarily needs to be connected to motor-movement of our bodies, because without it we couldn’t respond to these changes. Why then aren’t representations necessary? Because of the simple fact that we do not need to internalize the world in order to successfully navigate in it. The Portia spider and Webb’s crickets in Louise Barrett’s Beyond the Brain exemplifies this. Does all of this mean that we don’t internalize the world and create “representations”? No. However, in order for us to conduct science, we need to criticize and reflect upon the assumptions we make about ourselves –even the ones that seem to make sense in regard to conscious experience as well as the concepts standing for invisible inner processing.

I believe it too indulgent to see the brain as an infinitely complex organ, I just do not believe it to be the pinnacle of evolution. We just make far too many mistakes. I also believe that internalizing every single object that exist through our contact with them makes little sense too. The amount of cognitive load that this requires, in terms of representations, computation, memory and other concepts created by traditional cognitive literature, seems to me to be all too overwhelming. While it is true our brain allows us to act in ways afforded to few other animals, we are still animals and we are not too different from other animals either. In my mind then, it is simply more probable that our brain evolved to sufficiently solve navigating our environment in a cost-effective way, rather than overkill with extreme specialisation. Evolution should have selected for the simplest possible way to achieve, shouldn’t it?

Embodied emotion?

A quick note on EC and the lack of discussion on emotion. Becoming fascinated by the Embodied Cognition approach championed by, amongst many others, Barrett (2011), Wilson & Golonka (2012) and Nöe (2009) I find the embodied approach to enable explanation of behaviour without the use of representations. As taught through philosophy, the less assumptions a theory makes about the world, still being able to explain the phenomenon, the better science we are producing. While there are personal and emotional resistances to the idea that cognition belongs more so in the dynamic reciprocal relationship with the environment, body and brain rather than solely in the brain, I have found one area of discussion lacking. That of emotion.

[Edit 22/02/2013] Semin och Smith’s ‘Embodied grounding…’ has a few chapters on affect. Still emotion seem hard to account for under env-body-brain…

I have long wondered if not our [subjective] experience of emotion may just be the consequence of brain activity [in a horribly general sense, as it obviously does not hold scientifically]. We happen to pay attention to some of it as it blends into the collected sensory experience [and their reciprocal relationship] we call consciousness. This [simplistic] view is not entirely coherent with representationlistic ideas and cognitive research seem to want to put the initiating processes of our inner workings down to cognition, not emotion (however, on occasion emotion is defined within the cognition concept). Where does an embodied cognitive approach consider emotion?

I have, as of yet, not touched upon literature discussing the topic on embodied cognitive terms. I can accept that cognition is not in the brain, or perhaps rather, not solely in the brain. I can accept that perception of our environment is enough to have us experience the world such as that we think it is inside us -because- all we really need in a brain is an elaborate change-detector for all sensory modalities, the ability to form connections between these systems (as if they are separate or “geographically” determined biologically from the start anyways -ferret example in Barrett comes to mind) and the ability to guide motor-movement of our bodies [in relation to what we perceive in our environment and vice versa] (cricket or spider example here) [also connecting this to modalities throughout the brain and body].

However, when it comes to emotion, accepting it as a stimuli-response mechanism, follow representationalist assumptions. Although, some literature would have it that arousal could be enough to place within the brain, then the act of determining what type of arousal (what am I feeling?) would be dependent on the situational, environmental and bodily factors. This is however slightly unsatisfactory since it still seems to rely on representation.

I will thus, for now, await further literature in the embodied cognition perspective that will deal with emotion. If not I get to it first (just have a master thesis in EC to take care of). Suggested literature more than welcome.