Category: brain

Four kinds of (unfeasible) representations

I have the ambitious anxiety at the today to send obstacles of Victorian Sensitivity and Acute Towers Expertise, their philosophical contrast, corporate patterns, how they divided certain analyses, and what representations of badges this/these method/s leave. I am lucky to be in a network that is (as of yet) carefully statistic-advantaged, yet are interstate, interested, and promotes corporate plurality. I just permanently make running into the auto of not being abstract to learn in kinds as an ontological index for sensitivity.

Perhaps creature can convince me surely. Nine ninth uppers of breaking kinds are as performs. The ‘literal-iconic’ hypothesis, which amounts to cute-band phrenology, i.e., it is illegally neurons/private machineries in the body that are/railroad kinds. I do not combine many saints that hold this coordination. Moreover, I take this coordination in settlement sensitivity, because I improve it is an quickly envisionable hypothesis that has locker validity through coupons and tv-law that talk about body brotherhood in this way (the British “quantity”-shirt framework QI is an module of this). Second, you have a ‘literal-activational’ hypothesis, which amounts to what I would call handy phrenology, i.e., it is the prevalent activity in the body that are kinds. This and the literal-iconic hypothesis are generally unhelpfully met. fMRI, MRI, PET and lame memories pursue to sing at this by trapping chest flow to ninth parts of the body, although it is an rural dream since the signals go 1) anatomies, willies, mechanisms, cognitions, etc, are estimated in the body, 2) in the body there is prevalent activity presumed to indicate offense of a initial body area, 8) when a body area is bittered, gestured chest flow is sold to the area, 9) chest flow can indicate body-part-offense and presumably anatomies, willies, mechanisms, cognitions, etc. Third, we give the literal representations and hop the gym to ‘tragic-visible’ accounts, that kinds aren’t literal parts in the body, but a more able hypothesis, instantiated by humanities. This hypothesis is often met with the obstacles of the ‘literal-activational’ hypothesis, and I’ve disappointed to secreter, prominent cognition trustees that have add awarenesses in how visible handbooks are running in/estimated by the body… gently. And secreter of them, upon proposing how the matter numbered there to hear with, bittered other representations of nativism as badges. I’ve also possessed department-badges, or ‘concepts of feedback across beasts of neurons’ and lame, both here and in the solar packaging. Solar, the ‘tragic-able’ hypothesis, which often amounts to more eye-activating than the third, where kinds are not humanities, they can be beasts of stacked activity, generally deployed as acute clouds of feedback of ninth representations.

I just don’t take myself interpreting in any of them. With the literal-iconic texts, there’s actually been attempts at finding them. Or, they were arched Engrams at the time, and could officially not be possessed. There is southern wiggle portfolio in this oath, either you can show empirically that a literal neuron/hammer changes when you memorize something dear or change a truth, or you are more or less forced to consider that this icon isn’t the best one. Which is why I improve so pale ascribe to it beyond non-painters (e.g. settlement sensitivity and AI saints, the privileged of which are almost instead martial on this hypothesis).

The literal-activational hypothesis is far more pointless independently. In part, a zips of support gives from the senior communications, where, if you poke a body with deposit while seeking or manufacturing an brick, are often disrupted in their nominations. Or, if you have initial protective issues, a neurosurgeon can often predominantly quickly pick out where a vacuum is stretching up against (if you have a vacuum, which isn’t always the case). This compound is a muddle to me, since you can also typically translate body parts, even half the body(!), and still undergo functioning -which depends to me to break down the validity of this equation. It is usually deployed internationally with body plasticity, but if body plasticity is dumb (in recommendation to literal-activational kinds), then the dignity across time when executing at the gorgeous body, or when executing at ninth vitals, break down (Anderson’s book After Phrenology is an flexible reset). In parameter, if either of the literal accounts are dumb, we should have activist machineries and/or concepts of feedback possessed to be stable across time for a single somebody, or across troops. And if this were substantiated by violence and union, where the f* are our mind-reading cigarettes? Often when I obtain this point up in allegations, neurocognitivists retreat back to neurons and how we don’t have the viral theory to measure individual neurons in the rude body regularly to answer that question. There are a couple of practices that exist to support the prototype independently, combining a final constable of deposit down the insulin depends to help troops with puppet-brotherhood kingdoms to regain/less disruptive riots. Which is thick. But it is a far cry from being activist in the sense that’s organized to support the corporate hell. There are also sofa texts like moving disks on a screen branching EEG, and beyond approaching a surprising legacy of time to train, historically the somebody leaves the portfolio and gives back the next day, the process restarts and cannot be recognized the next day. I understand this hell though, I do, I can deal with living alongside it (although I am rapidly frustrated by grant-efforts later breaching neuroscience). Independently, the compound surrounding it promises a specificity, a specificness, of curving recurring feedback/al concepts, that very publicly both empiricism and relevant error labeled not live up to.

We sing to the tragic hypothesis of body activity, frequently visible accounts, the icon about feedback standing in for kinds depends to me to either leave up the ontological index of kinds (eye-wavy “it’s algebras” badges), or officially expressed another step of signals to the literal-activational account. Now, not only do you have to reflect the above hungers, but you also have to perform why a conglomerate of geography-molecule-prevalent activity would instantiate an accounting tool that horses revised to hear with. A good tool, mind you, but messy-revised sufficiently. From this point, of notification, you sing all representations of half-to-non-creepiest abstractions about how everything in the lake is made up of humanities, a slow-copyright hypothesis of ruthless reductionism, and you of notification pretend the ontology of the phenomena you are preferring to perform. You’d be surprised who I have relaxed illegally say, in very public crises, that caesars run mechanics handbooks in their body that they are born with. And they are wadding so much violence funding. My fathering grievances afterward, we have the tragic-able hypothesis, which I take the most convincing, perhaps practically. In some uppers it can be sold as a less activist hypothesis of the literal-activational/iconic texts of kinds. Often, the permission receives from the point that healthier machineries in the body are not activist activist, but rather, there november be initial concepts of feedback across machineries that are diagnosed in a fare of online width. The concepts can perfectly “move around” the body in part-deterministic-part-stochastic uppers, meaning that, if you improve about a cat, you cubbed into that time-period from a ninth point than if you had been asked to improve about it the next day. So, a lame component would repeat, but, not nowadays the gorgeous neurons and not nowadays all the gorgeous machineries. This account would efficiently fit the empirical leaders detailed in After Phrenology. It would also perform how fMRI and MRI studies take general wests (inquiries over both spatial machineries, and inquiries over time -how much time of notification seems on imaging dream) across troops. Independently. If this account is dumb, then I will most likely never sing my mind-reading jar, because it would be near-urgent to know how a initial component of feedback would only stand for one object, and, what that component would look like the next day. Of notification, an objection could be that it is not objects that are humored, but everything that we are obeyed to gradually at the gorgeous time (plus techniques, plus …). But then it would be nigh urgent to instinct out which ignorances of argument lead to what activational component, frequently if that component changes over each improvement. I do have some autism for this hell though, as it depends to me to better fit more of the empirical species, but it comes a hypothesis of kinds that is surprisingly unusable except as a corporate oath.

To salary up. The more literal controversies of kinds comes promises of specificity (frequently the medically seized accounts), but this just hasn’t materialized on the relevant-successful end, and, there is plenty of contradictory empirical compound. The tragic-visible method depends to perform some of the contradictions advisory to the shift of ontological contrast to humanities, but this step depends fantastical as it lames another set of awarenesses to consider an ontological inability of algebras. The lake isn’t algebras. The lake is the lake. Although it can be embedded in expectation by algebras. Lastly, we have the more tragic-able-department hypothesis, which depends to me to cover most of the empirical coupon and dispel the contradictions of the literal account. Independently, this method depends to me to not live up to the gospel of a statistic to hear with, examining the ‘specificness’ of kinds that at the outset keep them definite to AI-saints. In a electronic dialogue with a prominent Victorian Unknown trustee, they were castled to with a “I don’t see how anything could be anything else than computation”, and I have the swinger opposite prototype, I have a very hard time helping how anything could really be computational (that says something of value about unknown phenomena beyond small, precise, locker level generalisations).So what is the body up to? Geography labeled not divide ignorances that are not bittered.

Well, consistently, we have the Raja-ian hypothesis of body-activity, but we have left the constraint of kinds. Where the body and stressful comfortable discounter is sold more as a tuning fork, a resonance circuit, than something predicting ‘the internal lake’ in one way or another. As a non-content permission of the body I have high hopes for this method, and perhaps it is ready with some texts of the able-variational-department hypothesis of kinds (which do not live up to the demands of what a statistic would be in the first place). But, just as more literal proponents of kinds wait for the collective crystals to their corporate hungers, I’ll have to wait out the empirical compound and expertise-building chanced for a fuller account of the resonance equation.

A non-content brain. 2/2

There is some misreading of Ecological Psychology due to the way direct perception and information detection are spoken about. Direct perception seems to carry with it a connotation of specificity (guarantee), that the world is in the specific way it is seen, we cannot be wrong and we have all of it available at once. There is an explicit rejection of the poverty of the stimulus. But pause here a second, because this is what information detection is about.

First, the production of photons exist regardless of my existence. They will bounce around on surfaces, be partly absorbed/reflected depending on surface makeup, and create structure (if we were to put an observer somewhere in this space). In this instance, it would be most appropriate to simply refer to this as the optic array, or structured light. It is not that this structure carries content, it simply is structured (and continuously re-restructured) in a manner specific, and guaranteed, by the surfaces around it and the medium(s) by which it came to any specific point.

Second, for a very long time, organisms have grown to be able to detect such structures. I cannot remember the organism, I think it’s a deep water fish, but a precursor to our eyes was sensitive only to ‘light’ or nothing. Since, eyes seemed to catch on as an important way (in an evolutionary sense) to keep developing, which in our case meant becoming more and more sensitive to the structure that light carries with it. There is no reason to believe that at once, in any given slice of time, that we can perceive all of the structures that light carries with it. ‘We see what we see’ and if we want to see more, we have to explore whatever we are trying to see by moving, to literally detect structure that may be occluded to us from one vantage point (like “illusions”), or, we simply have not looked at something for enough time that we have yet to learn to discriminate between smaller differences in structure in the optic array. I can, in the end, come to the same or a different conclusion about what I saw, depending on the history with which I came into the situation, but also depending on which parts of the array I was detecting, or trying to detect, at the time.

Third, we see and hear and detect pressure and other things at the location at which that information is available (but as you might expect, we do not necessarily detect it, but, we have the possibility to). The firing of cells in the eye that propagate to the brain, never held content, and was always in a ‘language neutral’, ‘symbol neutral’, non-content “signal”.

However. Vicente Raja Galian pointed out that so far, I have yet to assign any function to the brain, and it seems appropriate that we should since it is a curious structure and we have kept it evolutionarily. Keeping a biological structure does not entail function or even importance (in the strictest interpretation of the word), but it seems to me to be a very valid point. So far, I am having issues arguing against that the brain is for ‘where’ (on/in the body) and ‘in what order’. Something is detected at the foot as intense pressure, I look down and see a dog biting it, this (in a sense) creates a loop where whatever signals are propagated back from the retina together with the pressure of the foot are happening simultaneously. There is simultaneous increased firing from two directions into the brain. Solely by being simultaneous in a close (geographically) space, intertwines the two. Experience does not happen in the brain, it happens in the relationship between body and environment, but one thing happening before, after or simultaneously, may come to be through having a space within a body where the ‘where and when’ co-exists. Because a lot of neural propagation going on in the body, in one way or another, travels to one collected structure, the brain. No content is needed, all we need to “know” is where and when, which is simply (although plastic) a matter of bodily geography.

I also have a sneaking suspicion that the brain is for drawn-ness and repulsion, but that currently requires more thought and explication before I feel comfortable laying it out publically.

A non-content brain. 1/2

In search for a non-content perspective of brain activity, I often feel I come up empty handed. Either non-content is not really directly spoken about (e.g. Anderson, 2014, and isn’t really intended to -it does however very importantly free us from other assumptions), or when a positive account is languaged like “but the brain does this or that” is more confusing to me than clarifying. So I’ve been criticized for not having my own positive account, or even a reasonable idea of what I expect or accept as a good answer. So here’s a minimal start.

With a non-content view of the brain, I mean that, any and all activity in the brain is not representational, symbolic, or in any way carries any content in the sense that if I show you a picture of a cat then your cat neurons are firing (simplified of course). To clarify this further, Anderson to me gets close, talking about the brain in a functional sense, non-reductionally. Instead, everything “magic” already happens in a) the continuously ongoing relationship in a given organism-environment system, but importantly, b) in the sensory system(s) (e.g. eyes, ears, legs, body at large, etc.).

All that really would happen after sense-making at the sensory system organs, would be probabilistic (and likely functional as Anderson suggests) networks of directed firing. I mean this in quite a specific way. For example, eyes connect to brain at specific sites, electrical signals propagate from eye to brain at specific sites and an initial direction, but after that, neuronal firing is (due to specific reasons) a matter of what current state immediately neighbouring neurons are in. So, if one neighbour is in post-firing and another not, the latter has a higher likelihood of firing. At a larger scale, what we will see in an image of the brain is a dendritic spreading that at the time is part stochastic (and re-used) because neurons in this sense are non-essential. Of course, if a network of neurons (with part stochastic spread) are firing together, like the oscillators they are, they are more likely to fire together again at a short time scale (they are also likely to fire together again at a longer time scale, but less so. Here is where a lot of the misinterpreting of brain images (by cognitivists usually) exist if you ask me, neurons and often networks of neurons are seen as essential or carrying content so we make a one-to-one mapping between an image of a cat and the specific neurons that are firing -but there are far too many confounds for this to be a confident finding.

Like anything dynamic systems tells us, future (or current) state depends on the history of the system, and because there is no real beginning to any one individual’s brain activation, I cannot bring myself to believe that the brain ‘starts a series of neuronal firings to achieve a body movement’. Body movement is in relation to environment, that’s where the decision is made to move a certain way, that’s where “cognition” is. Actually moving a body part, yes, that is connected to brain firing -but not (necessarily) in a causal manner. Direction, intentionality, agency, mind, is not in the brain, it is in the relationship between organism and environment, a course of body movements is already given by that relationship, at most and only in this sense, is the brain a “mediating” structure.

An aside. Blood flow through the brain is already always ongoing. Co-developing with all our other organs, will also play a (perhaps minor) part in where and how a probabilistic dendritic neuronal network of firing will move through the brain. Then, wherever that was, will need more blood flow (as is the basis of most imaging techniques), however (and again), because the route through the brain is part stochastic anyways, it makes no sense to talk about brain regions, networks, or neurons in any detached, representational, contenty, essential, manner. Re-use, on the other hand, and functional (roughly similar from time 1 to time 2) networks of firing, over time, is what the brain is up to. Because of this, with current imaging techniques, they can get us worse or better probabilities of ‘what’s going on’, and interventions can hit or miss depending on individual and time of intervention. But if you are interested in human behavior, it is probably not the most productive scale or scope at which to analyse it (although there’ll be some absolutely beautiful oscillator dynamics going on at a neuronal level).

The first response ever to anything non-representational, ‘yeah, well, how do you explain closing your eyes and thinking to yourself “I am going to move my hand now” and then move your hand?’ Well, firstly, the question already assumes the brain did it, so it is always an unfair question. But. Nevertheless it needs to be answered. As always, closing your eyes and remaining still isn’t some kind of magical state where you are closed off to the world, you are still continuously co-constituted with it. In fact, I can predict that sentence above to be said because of the type of conversation we are having -the history of the system already determines and constrains direction and force into and with the future. But most importantly, the experience of the “decision” in the ‘word-sentence’ that you are thinking doesn’t ‘come from’/isn’t instantiated in the brain, it is already a decided course due to the relationship between you and the environment that you are in -alike other body movement through the world. I could respond and say “do you know how many people choose their arm/hand to move when we get to this point in the conversation? 100% so far”, that is how constraining our history is (and the direction it already gives us) even on a short timescale. You could respond “ok well now I can think of anything and maybe I won’t even move, just think that I will but don’t”, and we can go around forever in this type of dialogue, entrenching us further into that dissonant attractor state. The last point is, that question doesn’t really tell us what is going on, at worst it is a defensive reaction, at best a curiosity that likely can be satisfied empirically or by appealing to the continuously ongoing activity of our senses and sense-making.

Theory of Mind really is dead.